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THIRD PARTIES IN NORTHE~ IRELAND: EXACERBATION OR AMELIORATION OF
CONFLICT?
1..

Introduction

Tensions in Third World nation states have imploded since the
end of the Cold War. While dramatic shifts in world power from
gee-political to gee-economics have been well documented, few
know about the rise in ethnic tensions in the post-Cold War
period.

Ethnic

gee-political

conflicts

are

intensifying:

events escalate in divided societies daily, tensions implode
in states in Africa, Asia,

and Eastern Europe,

and various

political cleavages have ignited local regional nationalisms,
leading

tG

violent

conflict

in

states

between

central

governments and separatist ethno-regional movements. There are
hundreds of thousands of refugees who have fled war-torn,
partitioned and segregated societies such as Rwanda, Bosnia,
and the Kashmir.
The

rise

in

ethnic

conflicts

is

one

of

the

critical

avenues for scholarly research in the 1990s as the resurgence
of micro-nationalism has compelled a drastic rethinking of the
assumption that

modernization and development

would

forge

diverse ethnic groups into a single entity within the nation
state.
Ireland

The

renaissance

d~ring

the

of

1960s,

ethno-nationalism
for

example,

in

Northern

rejuvenated

the

development of separate ethno-territorial identities. However,
the historic election of Nelson Mandela in South Africa and
the

recent

peace

accord

signed

between

Israel

and

the
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Palestinian Liberation Organization

(PLO)

suggested to the

analyst of political events that Northern Ireland would be the
next world trouble spot to be the focus of efforts to reach a
democratic and peaceful settlement.
The "Framework for Peace" announced by the British Prime
Minister

(PM)

John Major and his Irish counter-part Albert

Reynolds last December, includes a promise of no change to the
current constitutional position of Northern Ireland without
approval

of

a

majority

of

its

citizens.

This

"Joint

Declaration has been instrumental in getting the Provisional
IRA leadership to declare a "complete cessation of military
operations

in

Northern

Ireland".

However,

the

majority

Protestant Unionist community has no idea,of what is exactly
contained within the "Framework for Peace." Unionists believe
that

the

Provisional

IRA

has

used

violence

to

extract

concessions from the British government on Northern Ireland's
constitutional position within the United Kingdom (UK).
The Rev.

Dr.

Ian K.

Paisley,

leader of the Democratic

Unionist Party (DUP), has even gone as far as to accuse both
governments

of

creating a

"recipe

for

civil

war"

as

the

Provisional IRA has not declared a permanent cease-fire and
the out-lawed Loyalist paramilitary groups have indicated that
they will use violence to resist being "coerced or persuaded
into an all Ireland." With the specter of a Loyalist back-lash
still

hanging

over

the

very

fragile

cease-fire,

both

governments have served to alienate the Unionist population of
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Northern

Ireland.

The

conflict

seems

intractable

and

perpetuates itself because national and religious identity
issues remain unsettled and are day-to-day concerns

(Agnew,

1989; Northrup, 1989; Rose, 1971).
·.

However, sectarian assassinations have increased to such
an extent as to allow a "power-gap" to materialize.

Does the

current constitutional impasse and the war-weariness in the
Province suggest that a problem-solving approach could very
well succeed?

Are both parties to the conflict willing and

able to come to the table? This paper critically evaluates
previous

third-party

efforts

by

the

British

and

Irish

governments to find a geo-political solution by imposing a
consociational
Northern

power-sharing

Ireland.

Events

solution

have

on

recently

both

nations

in

de-escalated

in

Northern Ireland so that a new problem-solving approach must
be considered in an effort to reach a lasting and just peace.
Instead,

I propose an original and dynamic community-based

problem-solving

linkage

system between Northern

Ireland's

grassroots constituents and political elites. It is an attempt
to

create

a

mutually

beneficial

process

promoting

understanding, tolerance, and the sharing of commonalities in
beliefs,

identity, and behaviors among geo-political groups

involved in protracted conflict situations. This will allow
both

communities

to

learn

from

each other

and move

from

conflict regulation to the institutionalization of conflict
(Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994).
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2. Grass-Roots Problem-Solving Initiative

Efforts must be made to facilitate Protestants and Catholics
working

together

productively,

at

learning

the
to

local
accept

level,
and

smooth:Ly

respect

each

and

others

cultural differences thereby alleviating the potential

for

cultural misunderstanding which will promote a clean line of
vision and sense of direction which is
others cultural combinations.

sensitive to each

Efforts must be made to promote

positive social attitudes and structural changes between and
among both communities in Northern Ireland if improvements in
inter-community relations

are

Catholics ·must

learn

at

least

to

develop.

to

Protestants

interpret

one

and

anothers

divergent ways of communicating similar messages.
In order to eradicate the causes of entrenched.bigotry
and sectarianism that exist in Northern Ireland a variety of
various strata of contact and cooperation between people at
the local and regional levels could counter-act the reluctance
of both sides to

II

chat over the wall" or recognize kinship

ties across the sectarian divide (See Sarah Nelson, 1984; and
Rosemary

Harris,

1972) .

For

example,

in

Strasbourg,

Nationalist and Unionist MEPs vote together on issues that
effect

the

political

and

economic

situation

in

Northern

Ireland.
Inter-group contact under the right conditions may
reduce prejudice, not because it permits and
encourages
interpersonal
friendships
between
members of different groups, but rather because-it
changes the nature and structure of the intergroup
relation (Mcwhirter, 1983, 24).
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Britain and the Republic are member states within the
EU and signatories to the Maastricht treaty and are obliged to
obey all directives from Strasbourg and Brussels.

A European

federation of decentralized and equal regions will erode the
insular definition of cultural identity and place limits on
absolute autonomy as the pooling of sovereignty ushers in an
"erosion of frontiers" between member states and "has radical
implications

for

future

relations

between

the

Republic,

Northern Ireland and~reat Britain," (p.8) "as a community of
self-directing regions

(relate)

in a

democratic

and equal

manner to the other regions of a federal Europe"

(Kearney,

1988, 10).
Local regional identity and culture will begin to_grow in
importance as a European supra-national identity begins to
supersede and transcend a national identity as more political
attention will focus on Brussels rather than London or Dublin.
For example,

June 1991 saw the development of a

Community

Connections organization to develop cross-Border economic and
community development between community groups in West Cavan
and North Leitrim in the Irish Republic and West Fermanagh in
Ulster. Jenny Hopkins from the Regional Policy Department of
the

Europe.an

European

Commission stated that

Union

initiative

"to

break

this

is

down

the

a

part

of

a

unnecessary

border mentality that sometimes occurs and is entirely in the
spirit that the Commission wanted to see coming forward that
of communities on borders working together for their region"
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(The Impartial Reporter, 1991, 12).
Such

a

prospect

gradually erode

the

Ireland and will

of

more

regional

autonomy

border between Northern

and

will

Southern

also alleviate frontier tensions between

Spain and France over the separatist Basque region ·as each
region will be able to defend its sovereignty and independence
against the entanglement of central government.
Such a unity in diversity would help to fulfil the
deepest ideals of the founding fa the rs of the
European Community by removing one of the major
causes of human conflict - the non-recognition,
undervaluing, neglect and even elimination of the
identity of peoples (Hume, 1988, 48).

3. Forum Formation: Principle Political Actors Involved

Irwin (199+) writes:
Although it would be quite wrong to place the
responsibility of reducing the level of conflict in
Northern
Ireland,
or anywhere
else,
on
the
education system alone, I do wish to suggest that
integrated education plays a very special role in
this process, as it can change the character and
weave of a community's social fabric, while other
political and economic actions can only hope to
reshape the social fabric that is given (p.91).
It would be naive to assume that integrated education on its
own would heal the deep psycho-cultural wounds that permeate
every level

of

society in Northern Ireland.

A political

process that attempts to change the political structure may
prove a potentially useful foil to support perceptual changes
in the psycho-cultural dimension.

The political culture of

Northern Ireland is usually surmised as being polarized along
religious-nationalist

lines.

The

traditional

Protestant-
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Catholic cleavage is buttressed by the underlying attachment
of two distinct and separate nationalist identifications- British and Irish.

This separation is further accentuated by

the fact that Ulster's political parties are almost solely
bolstered by members of either one or the other religious
community.
Unionist

The Official Unionist party (OUP) and Democratic
party

(DUP)

are

almost

entirely

depen~ent

on

Protestant support while the Socialist Democratic and Labor
Party

(SDLP)

is almost exclusively Catholic.

A small non-

sectarian liberal Alliance party straddles the ethno-religious
communal divide.

NATIONALIST/REPUBLICAN

MIDDLE-GROUND

*

*

SDLP

*

SINN FEIN

UNIONIST/LOYALIST

* OUP

ALLIANCE

*

DUP

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Irish
National

Liberation

Army

( INLA) ,

and

the

Irish

People's

Liberation Army (IPLO) are the primary Republican paramilitary
organizations

that

seek

"to

shake

off

establish a 32 county socialist Republic.
Association

(UDA),

the

British

rule"

and

The Ulster Defence

Protestant Action Force

(PAF),

the

Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), and the Ulster Volunteer Force
(UVF) are the principal Loyalist paramilitary groups that wish
to preserve the

constitutional

status of Northern

Ireland

against Catholic nationalists, who continually plot to usurp
and overthrow the state.
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REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARIES

LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES

*

PIRA

*

*

INLA

* PAF

*

IPLO

*

UFF

*

UVF

4.

Analysis

and

Assessment

of

the

UDA

Dispute:

Substance,

Maturity, and Inter-Community Relations

The underlying reality in the case of Northern Ireland is the
reproduction of the state. Northern Ireland's constitutional
position serves to drive an ideological wedge between both
communities.

Ideology

itself

is

a

reflection

and

interpretation of reality and corresponds to what individuals,
whether Catholic or Protestant,
lives.

experience

in their daily

Thus, rather than simply structuring experience it is

shaped by it.

Catholics

in Northern Ireland represent

a

threat to Protestants not merely economically but politically
and religiously as well. It was this threat that shaped the
ideology of Protestants, not the other way around.
There is also the danger of placing too much emphasis
on the importance of fear, misunderstanding and the idea that
continued contact

can eventually ameliorate

which drive each other apart 11

(Hunter,

1983,

because the underlying reality remains intact.
place,

"those
53) .

forces
This is

In the first

while Protestants and Catholics do hold exaggerated
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fears

of

each other,

this

cannot

be

overcome

while

both

communities remain divided over the legitimacy of the state.
The

Northern

Ireland

state

was

opposition to a united Ireland.
link

with Britain and

Ireland parliament

founded

Protestant

It generated support for the

Protestants

(Stormont)

with

supported

the

Northern

for the maintenance of their

economic system. But of equal if not greater importance was
the

desire

to

Richard Rose
Ireland is

maintain

(1971)

political

and

religious

freedom.

concludes that the conflict in Northern

intractable precisely because

it

is

not

about

economic issues but about non-bargainable issues of religion
and nationality.

"There is little scope for politicians to

lead people along class lines"

(Rose, 1971, 388).

There have been periods in the 1930s and 1960s, however,
when

the

Protestant

and

Catholic

working-classes

have

cooperated with each other as the border question decreased in
significance.

Consequently, there is scope and latitude to

change the perception that politics in Ulster is a "zero-sum"
rather

than

a

"win-win"

situation,

if

the

constitutional

question is firmly dealt with.

5. Designing the Mediation Process

Both communities in Northern Ireland have immensely powerful
kinship, class, religious and residential ties which assist in
forging a strong sense of solidarity within each respective
community.

The idea is to formulate a long-term intermediate
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process that will promote frequent contact between members of
both commuaities at all levels.

British policy has failed to

deal with the structural conflict as any intervention made has
been surgical.

Therefore, the conflict has continued, since

the situation and incentives remain the same.
soldier

on,

maintaining

a

compromise

nationalists without reassuring unionists.

"The British

which

embitters

Like unionists and

nationalists,

they find themselves constrained to follow a

policy which

keeps

pursued

the

and

the

conflict

psychological

alive,"
and

as

the

political

policies
pressures

undermine any movement towards social and political change
(Whyte, 1981, 434).
The situation seems consummate for a dispute systems
design.

It would be an impossible task to eliminate the

underlying religious,

and psycho-cultural conflicts between

Protestants and Catholics overnight as they are too deeprooted.

These

social

political structure.

and

cultural

factors

reflect

the

The goals of a dispute systems design

will be, first of all, to identify the functions served by the
power contests and secondly, to design a means of fulfilling
those functions at lower cost to the parties.

The aim is not

to settle the conflict but to change the relationship between
both groups.
Girvin

(1986)

writes

that

"agreement

achieved when the Nationalist and Unionist

can

only

be

communities

in

Northern Ireland accept a particular and mutually agreeable
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formula

for

the

government

of

the

area"

(p.165).

Consequently, there is a need to create conditions which will
promote integrated education, devolved regional government and
frequent contact situations among members of the populace.
These structural and psycho-cultural incentives may eventually
lead to the eventual dissolution of sectarianism, by promoting
a program of affirmative action and accommodationist politics
and

by

closely

pursuing

"proceeding by small steps"

"intermediate

objectives"

or

(Whyte, 1990, 237)

The OUP document The Way Forward (1984) proposes just
that:
The Ulster Unionist Party, in putting forward this
document for discussion, is proposing a policy
whereby reconciliation and participation of all
sections of the community can be attempted from the
bottom up and not imposed from the top down. The
object is for all representatives to participate in
government in those areas which affect citizens
daily lives and concerning which the resolution of
conflict may be more feasible than on those
involving the future of Northern Ireland (p.3).
This

will

necessitate

building

a

problem-solving

relationshtp in which both sides will be assisted by interestbased negotiation in gradually moving towards a real internal
agreement

in

Ulster

over

the

constitutional

crisis.

The

process will foster better relations and cooperation between
both communities on the economic and political as well as the
psycho-cultural spheres.
both parties

motivation,

It will also necessitate increasing
skills

and

resources.

Problem-

solving negotiation will give Protestants and Catholics a
sense of control over the outcome and a substantial voice in
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the process.

As Ury et al.

(1988) contend: "Problem-solving

negotiation involves a great deal of mutual persuasion and
accommodation, and seeks a mutually satisfactory outcome" (p.
110) .

6. Effects of Previous Intervention: Hillsborough Accord

Contrary to the expectations of optimistic savants, British
policy towards Northern Ireland has been an attempt to export
British ideas wholesale

to a

different

cultural

territory

instead of adapting a broad strategy to local conditions. The
immobility of the current Joint Declaration to instigate a
devolved power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland suggests
that

it

is

now

a

particularly

apt

time

to

analyze

its

precursor, and main driving force behind current efforts to
bring both parties to the table, the historic bi-lateral pact
signed

between

the

British

and

Irish

governments.

The

Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Tom King stated in
the

House

of

Commons

after

the

internationally

binding

bilateral Accord had been signed:
Of course, no single agreement can solve all the
problems of Northern Ireland, but our hope is that
this agreement will provide a basis on which we can
build greater co-operation and trust betw~en the
two communities, and between the United Kingdom and
the Republic as well (House of Commons Minutes,
1985,

800).

The Agreement, shrewdly drafted,

cogently sets out the

current status of Northern Ireland as part of the Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as previously defined by
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successive British governments and indeed,
parliament,

in

Section

Constitution Act of 1976.

one

of

the

by the British

Northern

Ireland

However, the Accord,

refers to acceptance of the "current status" of
Northern Ireland but this current status is nowhere
defined.
This is simply to ensure that the
Agreement does not conflict with the Republic's
juridical claim to sovereignty over Northern
Ireland as defined in its constitution (Bew and
Patterson, 1987, 42)
As accepted by the Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister)
British Prime Minister,

Section A, Article 1

(a) (b)

and the
of the

Agreement means that for the first time in history, an Irish
government

is prepared to recognize

in an internationally

binding agreement that, "Ireland would remain divided as long
as Northern Unionists desired it to be"

(Rolston, 1987, 68).

The legal implication of this Accord must also be considered
in relation to the provisions of the Constitution of Ireland.
Article two of Bunnreacht na hEireann

(Irish Constitution)

declares the "National territory to consist,
the whole island of Ireland."

inter-alia, of

Article three sets out the

right of the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) and government "to
exercise jurisdiction over the whole of the territory."
O'Leary (1987) astutely points out:
The Anglo-Irish Agreement does not represent the de
jure
abandonment
of
the
Irish
Republic's
constitutional claim to Northern Ireland (but it
does) represent the de facto abandonment of Irish
unification as a policy goal of Fine Gael and the
Irish Labour Party (and it)
binds the Irish
Republic to a constitutional mode of reunification
which is known to be practically infeasible and
therefore facilitates the end of the Nationalist
monolith in the Republic's politics (pp. 6-7)

As
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The Treaty,

guaranteeing as it does that there will be no
(Constitution or otherwise)

change in the current status

Northern

Ireland,

save

with

the

consent

of

the

of

Unionist

majority reflects in precise form, what has been called the
"British

guarantee"

to

the

Unionists,

and

therefore,

incorporates a clearly defined veto for the majority.
The value of the British "guarantee" is also
undermined
by the
doctrine
of
parliamentary
sovereignty whereby no parliament can bind its
successor. This fact is particularly important as
the main opposition party at Westminster is
committed to the reunification of Ireland (McGarry,
1988,

239).

For external guarantors to make a positive contribution to
conflict resolution they must, paradoxically, either wield a
phenomenal amount of power and responsibility or none at all.
In other words, the guarantor must either have the wil1ingness
and ability to intervene to uphold whatever it has guaranteed
or must be so weak and uninterested as to have no influence
within the "ethnic frontier."

Thus, the Anglo- Irish Agreement

was an attempt to establish a framework to dragoon both sides
into getting together to form some kind of devolved powersharing executive
British

and

Irish

and

to

guarantee

mainstream

Northern

Ireland

Sovereignty

politics.

retained by one of the guarantors, Britain.

This,

from
was

in fact,

has been a"matter of debate since both the conclusion of the
majority in the Kilbrandon Report (1984) and one of the models
set out in the Forum Report (1984) was of joint sovereignty or
joint authority between the British and

Irish governments
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thus, giving full recognition to the minority's nationalist
aspirations rather than the "token" gesture of a consultative
role as set out in the Hillsborough Accord.

Bew and Patterson

(1985) assert that:
if Britain were finally to break with the policy of
trying to secure Catholic support by holding out
hopes of an Irish dimension with no substance to
it, they would not only help to clarify the issues
in a positive way, but also remove the uncertainty
on which the Democratic Unionist party and the PIRA
thrive (p. 133).
The snag in not implementing joint sovereignty or condominium
is

that

it

means

that

the

Irish

government

has

to

have

complete faith in the British government to impose what is
agreed at conference level, and in this way can be seen by the
Catholic community as playing a lesser role.

However, given

the Loyalist response to what was agreed, it could be argued
that

joint

unworkable.
of

authority

would

have

quickly

proved

totally

Certainly, some of the suggestions in Chapter 12

the Kilbrandon inquiry seemed to be overly hopeful of

Unionist co-operation in something which is probably not in
Once involved the external guarantors may

their interests.

find it impossible to stop themselves being dragged into the
conflict situation.

This is what happened to Greece, Turkey,

and Britain in the case of Cyprus after the collapse of the
1960 Constitution.
The Hillsborough Accord was registered with the United
Nations

and

is

a

recognized Accord between

two

sovereign

powers and as such it could not be reneged on without serious
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consequences.

The International Fund set up by the British

and Irish governments received financial aid from the USA ($50
million), Canada ($10 million), New Zealand and the EC which
has "locked the two Governments into the Agreement through the
embarrassment

they would suffer

internationally if

either

repudiated what international opinion had endorsed with their
encouragement" (Guelke, 1988, 162).

However, what the British

did not realize was that it clearly had the advantage over the
Sunningdale Agreement of 1973, in that the Agreement would not
easily

be

brought

down

by

internal

forces

finding

the

institutions unworkable; they as guarantors "on the Unionist
side" were and are not seen as such by Unionists.

In other

words, the relations between the Ulster-British to the British
became so poor after the Accord that Britain is in no way
perceived as their concrete guarantor.

O' Malley (1983) neatly

encapsulates this point: "None of the parties to the conflict
trusts Britain,

and with good cause.

Because she will not

declare herself, no one knows where she stands"
From the Unionist perspective,
the

manner

in

which

it

was

(p. 254).

the whole process and

negotiated,

has

marked

the

beginning of the "sell-out" of their interests to the Free
State government and as the thin end of a wedge down the
"slippery slope" to Irish unification.
than ever Unionists feel

Therefore, now more

that their backs are against

the

wall, their fear and feelings of insecurity and betrayal will
ensure that they give "not an inch," which in turn undermines
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their absolute trust in Westminster.

Mr. Neil Kinnock, the

leader of the British Labor party, voiced his opinion on the
Accord stating:
The cause of this agreement would have been better
served if she (Mrs. Thatcher) had taken the advice
of my right honourable and learned friend, the
member
of
Warley-West
(Mr.
Archer)
and
my
honourable friend for Hammersmith (Mr. Sorley) last
year when they asked her to try to spell out to the
Unionist communities what there intentions were in
developing
the
relationship
with
the
Dublin
government. That might not have assuaged all fears,
it might not have silenced the shouts, but it would
have been evidence of trust.and consultation which
could have provided an essential credential for the
agreement now (House of Commons Minutes, 1985,
755)
The

Thatcherite

government

tried

to

reassure

the

Unionists that the British Parliament would make all the final
decisions

for Northern

Ireland.

The

Parliamentary-under-

secretary for Northern Ireland stated in the Commons:
The fears of the Unionists are addressed
guarantees about the status of Northern Ireland
the recognition that at the moment there is
consent. British Ministers will have to make
decisions on matters affecting life North of
border, while it remains for Irish Ministers
take decisions affecting matters South of
border (House of Commons Minutes, 1985, 964)
The

Agreement,

however,

by

not

allowing

more

by
and
no
the
the
to
the

scope

for

positive negotiations with the Nationalist minority has made
the Unionist position more intransigent and "is a recipe for
sectarian confrontation" (Bew and Patterson, 1987, 56)

Their

fears and feelings of insecurity and betrayal by the British
government has ensured that they will give "not an inch."
Agreement has put an end to Protestant supremacy,

The

but has
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placed

Protestant

identity.

The

identity on

Accord

an

even

effectively

par

ended

dialogue and mutual accommodation as a

with

any

Catholic

attempts

at

result of inducing

these feelings in the Unionist bloc as "the liberals and the
neanderthals make common cause" (Bew and Patterson, 1987, 45) .
Unionists perceive that the Accord is against their interests
and, indeed, due to their lack of input, as unjust.
The Hong Kong and Gibraltar cases are most
obviously relevant to Unionist anxieties that the
British governm~nt will seek to use the Anglo-Irish
Agreement to lever the Province into a position
where a majority can be induced to acquiesce in a
united Ireland. Such anxieties tend to produce an
accentuation of the sectarian divide as, in the
last resort, the solidarity of the Protestant
community is seen as the most reliable barrier to
the construction of consent to a united Ireland
(Guelke, 1988, 106).
Perhaps, one virtue of the Agreement is that it has made
very clear that any return to Stormont-type rule is not a
viable alternative.

If the Accord is to allow a consociation

type system to be set up there will have to be great changes
in

attitudes,

changes

which

the

external

mediators

(the

British and Irish governments) seem not to be able to induce
with either "sticks" or "carrots."
Interests
negotiatio~
procedures

are

based

procedures

non-existent

used either

focus

in

such

as

Northern

on rights

consociation by the British government,

problem-solving
Ireland.

such as voluntary
or on power such as

coercive consociationalism (O'Leary and McGarry,

Agreement

"was

designed

to

change

The

the

1993). The

structure

of

the
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incentives facing the elites of both blocs, to encourage elite
autonomy within Northern Ireland's political parties, ·and, by
shifting the political terrain, to allow the 'unthinkable' to
be thought"

(O'Leary, 1989, 580).

O'Leary (1987)

claims that,

"the Accord symbolically

establishes the constitutional equality of the Northern Irish
minority"

(p.15).

The

problem

with

this

international

agreement however, seems to be that it was seen by part of the
nationalist community as in their interest up to a point and

was dismissed by Sinn Fein supporters as a

"paper tiger."

First of all, the Agreement did not made any concrete reforms
in areas most affecting the nationalist community--the legal,
security and economic structures.
note:

"Expectations

have

been

Bew and Patterson

raised

in

the

(1988)

nationalist

community which have not been satisfied in part, because of
the Agreement's focus on the symbolic and cultural basis of
national
basis"

alienation rather than the economic and material

(p. 81).

The

RUC

and

the

UDR were

acceptable to nationalists.

not

reformed

so

as

to

be

Attitudes to the security forces

have been deeply ingrained in nationalist's minds.

However,

the initial clashes between ultra-Loyalists and the RUC,

in

the wake of the Agreement, made the RUC more acceptable to the
minority,
which

al though probably because of

makes

enemy's

the

enemy is

whole

Agreement

my friend."

the old ph~losophy

agreeable,

This

follows

that
the

is,

''my

trend of
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previous

British

constitutional

initiatives;

reforms

concessions are much talked of but never implemented.

and

It has

done nothing substantial for Nationalists but has made the
Unionist position more intransigent, inducing the feeling of
"we will not give an inch" in Unionists,

thereby worsening

relations between the two communities.
From the

Rep1:1-blic

of

Ireland's

point

of

view,

Dr.

'

FitzGerald felt that the Agreement meant that for the first
time the British government not only accepted the Nationalist
aspiration

to

unity

but

would

in

the

occurrence, assist in bringing it about.

event

of

such

an

The recognition of

the right of the people in the six counties to remain a part
of the United Kingdom until a majority of the populace voted
otherwise,

was

a

fairly

acceptable

price

to

pay

for

consultative role in the governing of Northern Ireland.

a

"The

Agreement clearly gives the Republic more than an advisory
role in Northern Ireland although not an executive say.
effect,

international
issues,"

has

Republic

the

law,

(Girvin,

responsibility,
responsibility"

at

to

be

gained

involved
159)

1986,
least

to

a
in

"if

legal

right,

determining

in

central
without

power

not

much

without

influence

In

(Cox, 1987, 91)

A substantial and evolving Irish dimension was achieved,
enough to satisfy the constitutional minority party- -the SDLP.
It

must

Republic

be pointed out
may aspire

to

that while public
unity,

the

opinion

citizens

of

the

in

the

Irish
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Republic are more concerned with bread and butter issues than
with a financially worse off bankrupt united Ireland.

Mair

(1987) astutely writes:
The emergence of a new nationalism (based around
pragmatic economic self-respect) which derives its
legitimacy from the 26-county state itself has
necessarily eroded the ideological relevance of
strictly irredentist nationalism,
and although
mainstream political rhetoric still pays obeisance
to anti-partitionism, the demand for and commitment
to Irish unity has lost much of its political
appeal (p. 86) .
Although the Agreement allowed for the setting up of a
permanent mechanism--the inter-governmental conference (IGC)
and

a

perR1anent

secretariat,

full

responsibility

for

the

decisions and administration of government remains with the
United

Kingdom

advantage

of

(UK).

Therefore,

insulating domestic

the

Agreement

politics

in

has

Britain

the
and

Ireland from Northern Ireland's "troubles," thereby,
reducing the danger that opinion in either the UK
mainland or the Republic will be magnetised by the
protagonists in the conflict.
In Britain's case
this was strongly underlined by the failure of
Unionist protests against the Agreement to evoke a
sympathetic response.
Indeed, the more violently
Loyalists protested against the Agreement, the
stronger was the desire of British opinion that the
province be kept at arms length and the tighter the
grip of the Agreement became (Guelke, 1988, 100).
The Irish government will be able to put forward views and
proposals "in the conference on stated aspects of Northern
Ireland affairs, but matters pertaining to the administration
of Northern Ireland, or the position of Nationalists there,
remains in the hands of the British government.

"The British

government did not surrender their sovereignty over the North"
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(Rolston, 1987, 67).
of

the

Irish

Nationalists.

According to the Accord, the government

Republic
But

is

representative

of

Northern

it has not given the South a n·ew role

because it has always been able to make its views on policy in
the six counties known to the British government.
The important question is what influence, if any, can the
Southern government really have on British policy-making in
Northern Ireland?

The British government was quite correct in

reassuring Unionists that they will make all final decisions.
"The British have sovereignty, but no territorial claim.

The

Irish have a territorial claim but no sovereignty" (Cox, 1987,
87) .

How

much

influence,

or

how

much

pressure

can

the

Republic's government bring to bear on Westminster Mhen it
does not have any financial backing to support its proposals?
Britain holds the purse strings, therefore, ultimately decides
policy.

Rather

government's
cement

than

helping

Nationalists,

the

involvement has been perceived as helping to

British

international

rule

in Northern

embarrassment,

Ireland,

promoting

curbing British

close

security cooperation_ and in recognizing the

cross-border
legitimacy of

Northern Ireland as part of the British Union.
government• by

its

conference

is

seen

as

has

been

dismissed

Agreement

Irish

Nationalists.

involvement

in

condoning
as

the

inter-governmental

British
a

The Irish

policy

paper-tiger

and
by

the
many

The South has no real power to influence policy
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decisions in Northern Ireland (See Bill Rolston, 1987, 70-75).
On the other hand, one could argue, that the Accord at
last

recognized

that

greater

involvement

of

the

Irish

government in the enforcement of law against terrorist crimes
could not be expected by the British government unless it was
willing to allow the Republic to be involved to some degree in
matters other than security which affect the welfare of the
minority community in Northern Ireland. The Accord faces up to
the fact that "without some kind of authority that depends on
both the British and Irish governments,
authority

in

Northern

Ireland

at

all"

there will
(p.

xiv)

be no
since

"conflicting sovereignty claims to disputed nationality zones
are inherently unresolvable"
In
campaign

the
to

SDLP

have

(Wright, 1988, 220).

opinion,
an

Irish

it

was

the

dimension

culmination of
recognized

a

while

simultaneously having the road to an internal devolved powersharing government within the six counties re-established in
order to reverse the political rise of Sinn Fein.
leader of -the SDLP,

John Hume stated:

As the

"The conflict is not

between Unionism and Nationalism, between Britain and Ireland,
or still less, between Protestantism and Catholicism.

It is

a struggle between those who believe in the political process,
and those who do not"

(Arthur, 1986, 14).

The decrease in support for both PIRA and Sinn Fein
were not a

long term phenomenon as the initial popularity

boost for the SDLP could not be sustained by empty promises
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I

and no reforms.
note

the

Rolston (1987), and Bew and Patterson (1987)
I

failure

of

the

Agreement

to

prop

I

up1

the

constitutional nationalism of the SDLP because it did not
I

deliver a fraction of the benefits initially desired.

Rolston
I

i

writes:

(1987)

"The changes have been few,

and those ~hich
•

I

have occurred have been presented by the British as having
been planned prior to and/or independently of the Anglo-Irish
process"

(p. 74) .

'

There has been no change in the eco0omic
I

position of Nationalists, which decreased their faith i~ the
I

Accord, and in the SDLP, damaging the SDLP's political career
i

somewhat, but not enough to cause total disillusionment and a
nationalist shift to Sinn Fein as the only alternative.
Rolston (1987) on the other hand argues that,
Sinn Fein's solid base in nationalist working-class
communities is an important source of electoral
support (and) this base in the community ensures
Sinn Fein of a potential vote in excess of the
militant
Republican
section
of
Northern
nationalism. Some nationalists vote Sinn Fein
because of its links with the IRA, while others can
continue to vote Sinn Fein despite these 1 inks

1

(p.65).

The failure of the Hillsborough Accord to achieve peace: and
I

reconciliation could only increase cynicism over the success
I

of

the

1991

Brooke

initiative

to

set-up

a

I

devqlved

consociational arrangement in Northern Ireland.
i

I

Wright (1988) counseli that the bi-lateral Accord has
"changed the situation irrevocably" in Ulster as it may permit
the

emergence

of

an

internal

legitimate

power-sha~ing
i

arrangement to gradually develop under the tutelage of both
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the British and

Irish governments.

Maxon-Browne·

(1983)

however, cautions against seeking a final settlement:
There is a strong case for trying to create an
atmosphere where the problems themselves either
change, or become redefined. To seek a solution to
the Northern Ireland problem is to pursue a mirage
in the desert: a better ploy would be to irrigate
the desert until the landscape looks more inviting
(p.178).

7. Previous Third Party Policy:Who Should the Third Party Be?
What

should the composition of a

British policy

since

1969

has

third party be and why?

undergone

many

changes

in

direction corresponding to changing British conceptions of the
conflict.

One factor has remained consistent howe~er,

continued reluctance of Britain to get

the

involved fully or

whole-heartedly in the Northern Ireland problem.

The British

government has tried consistently to extricate herself and
failing

to

this

Therefore,

in

decrease

Northern

her

Ireland,

involvement
the

II

external

and
II

costs.

mediator,

Britain, can be seen as the cause of the ethnic conflict and
yet

also

the

restraining factor

that

prevents

an

extreme

escalation of the level of violence.
On th~ other hand,

British policy since 1972 has done

much to foster division and sectarian conflict, as it has been
one long series of bungles, mistakes and miscalculations (Bew
and Patterson,
being basically

1985) .
II

It could correctly be described as

crisis management 11

,

i.e.,

ad-hoc measures

being introduced as the situation arose but without regard to
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their long-term effects.

The problem with British policy in

Northern Ireland is that

it has been an attempt

British solutions to an Irish problem.

to apply

However, it has to be

pointed out that British efforts "to do something in Ireland,"
will always be fraught with difficulties and any intervention
she makes, as with the case of Cyprus, cannot be surgical, its
effects are incalculable.

Hence,

it would appear that the

external guarantor, once "locked into" the antagonism not only
finds it difficult to unilaterally decide to "pull out" but is
soon in a position in which the "ethnic leaders" are unable to
bar him from intervening in the dispute.
British policy since the

conception of

the

'Ulster

crisis' has done nothing to eradicate sectarianism and perhaps
has made

it even more severe;

changing the

economic

nor has policy assisted in

and structural

Catholics and Protestants.
not yet been reformed,

inequalities

between

The legal and judicial process has

the security forces have not become

acceptable to the Nationalist community and the Agreement-" direct

ru.le

with a

green

tinge" - -has

support for Sinn Fein and the PIRA.

failed

to

decrease

Britain has provided

cosmetic concessions but no real reforms (Bew and Patterson,
1988,

78).

Therefore, external forces can come into play as either
potential creators of some sort of "tranquility", preventing
widespread communal violence by providing the glue to prevent
complete social division,

or catalysts for the spiral into
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ultimate chaos.

Of course,

there are other,

more

"local"

reasons why a situation of mutual hostility may be kept below
the surface and not allowed to deteriorate beyond a certain
point.

For

example,

Esman,

writing

about

Malay-Chinese

relations in Malaysia states:
The
communities
co-exist
in a
condition of
precarious
mutual
deterrence
or
unstable
equilibrium. Since each community is in a position
both to defend itself and to inflict unacceptable
damage on the other, there are strong incentives,
particularly among leadership elements, to pursue
policies of peaceful, if competitive co-existence
and mutual, if competitive accommodation. Neither
community, not withstanding the fantacies of their
more chauvinistic members, is strong enough to
expel or destroy the other without risking heavy
punisnment on itself (Boal and Douglas, 1982, 347).
The relationship described above can be held to exist in any
state where one community is unable to completely subQrdinate
the other without

inflicting on itself unacceptable costs

(Which is a reason to promote forms of mutual cooperation).
British policy since 1969 has been aptly summarized by
Bew and Patterson (1985) when they contend that its effect has
been "to manipulate and domesticate rather than transform or
eradicate"

(p.

177)

Therefore,

one can but question the

sincerity of those involved in the policy-making process as
actions are taken due to self-interests, and the pressures of
international opinion rather than of genuine concern over the
existing situation.
As a result of the failure of successive British
political initiatives, the British state came ·to
appear less as a positive political presence within
the province, standing above the centrifugal forces
of sectarianism, than as a weak intermediary unable
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to impose its will and too vulnerable to pressure
to seem neutral (Guelke, 1988, 107).
Therefore,
instance

the
the

multiple
British

guarantors/arbitrators,

and

Irish

governments,

in

this

have

not

ameliorated but have rather exacerbated sectarian conflict in
Northern Ireland.

Both governments do not fully understand

the nature of the conflict or realize that a solution cannot
be injected or transplanted from outside no matter how well
meaning the intervenor.

Hence, the values of both governments

have not been effective in helping both communities resolve
their disputes

equitably and without

violence.

The

move

toward reconciliation must come from all parties within the
As the Loyalist paramilitary UDA assert in their

Province.

Common Sense: Northern Ireland, An Agreed Process document of
1987:

The (Anglo- Irish) Accord will not bring peace,
stability nor reconciliation to Northern Ireland
because it is a contract between two governments
and not an agreement between those in the cockpit
of the conflict - Ulster Protestants and Ulster
Catholics (p. i).

8. The Third Party

As a result of the Single European Act and the Maastricht
treaty,

the

sovereignty

of

each

member

state

begins

to

disappear as the Council of Ministers possess the ultimate
veto power in all EU matters.
eliminated,

no

state

legislation

which

will

will

be

With the power of ultimate veto
be

in

binding

a

position
on

all

to

delay

parties.

EU
The
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elimination of political borders will assist in decreasing the
division between both communities over the legitimacy of the
state.
Therefore, the Northern Ireland region will come more and
more under the auspices of the Council of Ministers who will
dictate policies and allocate budgets,
therefore,
Northern
Revd.

Dr.

for a

the

It is logical,

mediation team to comprise

Ireland MEPs- -Jim Nicholson OUP,

of

the

three

John Hume

SDLP,

Ian Paisley DUP--and four other members· from the

European parliament.
and

etc.

Having four MEPs--two each from Belgian

Netherlands--from

outside

of

the

Province

will

reinforce the legitimacy of the mediation team and prevent any
opposition from the DUP or Sinn Fein.

These "neutral" MEPs

are familiar with the communal divisions and power-sharing
mechanisms which led to successful political accommodation in
their own respectful divided societies.
This mediation team will have the knowledge and ability
therefore, to assist both parties in identifying the i~sues of
importance to change the direction,
dispute,

and would be honest,

acceptable to both parties.

mode and base

of

the

objective and fair as to be

O'Leary (1989) has written:

European arbitrators of interests in Northern
Ireland are less likely to be regarded as enemies
of either segment and greater European integration
will make the differences between membership of the
British and Irish states less salient over time.
Such developments will not provide a panacea for
Northern Ireland but will make consociation more
rather than less feasible (p. 586).
Therefore,

escalating conflict costs may ensure that

31

pressures to reach a problem-solving solution may be stronger.
It would be the purpose of the European mediation ·team to
facilitate this process.

8. In What Environment Should the Mediation Process Be Set?

This phase of the design process can be accomplished in three
stages.

First of all, the representatives of each political

party should meet with the mediation team outside the Province
every six months.

This would allow for a more constructive

negotiation and improve the prospects for success.

Second,

the interaction between these representatives and their "grass
roots"

based

government)

constituents

at

County

Council

level

( local

will allow for a strategically important input

from the latter.

The focus will be on an interests-based

approach as it will "help parties identify which issues are of
greater concern to one than to the other"
13).

Finally,

organizations

Loyalist

should

meet

on

and
an

(Ury et al., 1988,

Republican
informal

paramilitary

basis.

Their

contribution will be vital as they possess the power to "pullthe-plug" on any type of negotiated settlement that they are
not included in.
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THIRD PARTY FACILITATOR

*

Three MEPs from Northern Ireland and four MEPs from Belgium

and the Netherlands.

PARTIES AT THE TABLE
NATIONALIST/REPUBLICAN

*

MIDDLE-GROUND

UNIONIST/LOYALIST

* ALLIANCE

SDLP

* OUP

* SINN FEIN

* DUP

CLUSTER 1

CLUSTER 2

COUNTY COUNCIL

REPUBLICAN/LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES

* NATIONALIST/UNIONIST

* PIRA/INLA/IPLO

GRASS ROOTS REPRESENTATION

* UDA/PAC/UFF/UVF

9. Criteria Necessary for Intervention: Interests
What interests will be satisfied if a process is to be put in
place which will allow a

framework to develop a

solution?

Ulster Protestants and Ulster Catholics, first of all, have to
be reassured that a problem-solving initiative will focus on
their interests, decrease inter-community strife, violence and
polarization,
facilitators

and

allow

and not

the

team

arbitrators

of

MEPs

to

act

in this process.

It

as
is

important that the parties concerned have confidence in the
mediation team knowing that they will not be manipulated by
external

governmental

intervention.

Secondly,

both

the
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British and Irish governments have to made aware (in view of
their past history) that any involvement by either party will
increase tensions and polarization, leading to a break-down in
negotiation.

Finally, the MEPs can learn much about conflict

management"through their involvement as third party mediator
in facilitating both parties in Northern Ireland.
can

use

this

knowledge

in

applying

conflict

approaches to other ethno-territorial conflicts

The MEPs
management

(Basque and

Corsican) within the EU.

10. Who Will Sit At The Table?

Who are the parties that will sit at the table? Who will
decide

on

the

eligibility

of

the

participants?

The

progressive UDA document Common Sense (1987) states:
The increased exposure and examination of Southern
Irish society has further increased disillusionment
for Ulster Catholics in the prospect of a united
Ireland.
At the same time Ulster Protestants
recognize the need for a reasonable and acceptable
alternative to the Agreement.
They recognize that
it is not enough to simply say no (p.ii)
Therefore,

a

not

insubstantial

number

of

Unionists

and

Nationalists realize that any process for reconciliation must
come from within Ulster.

It is imperative therefore, that all

social, political and paramilitary forces in Northern Ireland
have an input into the agenda and all procedural matters.
segment

of

either

population

should

be

ineligible

No
for

participation as any likely outcome will effect the status and
future of all Ulstermen and women.

As Bradley (1988) astutely
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observes,

the first step in the "alligator analysis II is in

"determining the parties who have power to make something
happen and the parties with the power to block it, and (make)
sure that all these parties are involved from the start"

(p.

52) .

The history of Northern Ireland has demonstrated that any
one party has the ability to "take-down" any policy initiative
that

they

are

interests.

not

a

party to

or

which

undermines

their

The key, therefore, in this approach is to include

all disputing parties that could contribute to or block this
process.

11. Party Representation

It

may

be

that

the

principal

Unionist

and

Nationalist

constitutional parties may not wish to sit at the table with
Sinn Fein or any other paramilitary group

who

renounce

Sinn Fein has

violence

argued that

and terrorism.

any movement

towards

However,
the

ending of

refuse

to

sectarian

conflict must come from grass-roots Protestant and Catholic
workers. Sinn Fein has sought and received support from the
left of the British Labor party to initiate a complete British
withdrawal
1985).

from

Northern

Ireland

(see

Bew and

Patterson,

Similarly, the Loyalist UDA have acknowledged that the

pragmatic road to change must involve both traditions coming
together to "co-determine the nature of their society; how it
would be shaped, and _how it would be governed" (Common Sense,
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1987, 4)
It

is

Loyalist

important

paramilitary

legitimacy of

not

to

groups

alienate
by

their political

the

denying

world

view

Republican

the
and,

cogency

and
and

therefore,

important contributions and input into the actual process.
A case could be made for allowing the British and Irish
government-:l to have an observer role during the stages of
negotiation.

However, the Joint Declaration has clearly shown

that any constitutional initiative which has involved either
party in the last 21 years has failed dismally,
rather than de-escalating events.

escalating

In order for the process to

have any chance of success therefore,

it would be wise to

exclude both governments from the actual process.

The British

government retains sovereignty and holds the tenants of power.

SUMMARY

1. Third party facilitator: TEAM OF SEVEN EURO. MEPs
2.Parties:

NATIONALIST/REPUBLICAN

SDLP

and

SINN

FEIN;

UNIONIST/LOYALIST - OUP and DUP;
MIDDLE-GROUND - ALLIANCE PARTY.

3. Clusters COUNTY COUNCILS - GRASS-ROOTS BASED CONSTITUENTS;
REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARIES - PIRA and INLA;
LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES - UDA, PAC, UFF and UVF

12. Setting/Forum

Bercovitch (1984) contends that "the setting for intervention
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must be physically apart from the location of the conflict"
(p. 29).

The setting must be neutral, informal and flexible

so as not to favor either party.

This will allow for the

right psychological climate to develop which will decrease
stress and tension, · and permit
problem-solving

interests

both parties

based

negotiation

to explore a
with

fresh

confidence as to its credibility.
The

site

itself

is

very

important

as

it

must

be

neutral, comfortable and spacious as to lead to a situational
balance of power.

A luxury hotel in Brussels would be most

appropriate for the MEPs and members of the political parties;
the Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries can use the offices
of the Students Union at Queen's University; while the spatial
features of the local County Council offices will comfortably
facilitate the interaction of grass-roots based constituents.
The milieu will be arranged so as to maximize proximity, and
side

by

side

seating

is

deemed

more

preferable

to

the

conventional face to face seating.

It is surmised that each

individual party will sit together.

Depending on the size of

the

participating

necessary.

group,

no

form

of

identification

is

Finally, writing material will be provided.

13. Time/ Timing

When should each conference take place?
meet?

How often should they

Is there an optimum time for settlement?

Both parties

should decide when and how often the main conferences and any
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other clusters should meet.

However,

the first conference

should meet before Christmas- -a neutral and non-symbolic event
in Northern Ireland.

Both disputing parties should not be

rushed through the stages

of mediation.

It

is

important

therefore, that -the third party be responsive to the needs and
wishes of both groups.

1.4.

The Process

How do we get the parties to the table, get them to huy into
the forum and accept one another's participation?

Bew and

Patterson (1988) argue that, "any constitutional shell which
might reduce the divisions in Ulster ought to be considered
seriously"

(p.

8 O) .

Before the process

could begin,

the

British and Irish Governments would have to implement the
following eight policy proposals as an incentive package to
get all parties to sit at the table:
The UDAs Common Sense document of 1987 proposes: 1)
A devolved power-sharing executive instead of the
Hillsborough Accord which is designed to avoid the
institutionalisation of sectarian divisions by
allocating seats to Stormont
(Parliament)
in
proportion to the number of votes cast for each
individual party in the Province.
2) A Bill of Rights,

a Supreme Court charged with
the upholding the Constitution and the rights of
each individual and the institution of referenda
would contribute to peaceful change despite strong
sub-cultural segmentation in the political system.
3) A Constitution to be implemented by a two-third
majority in a referendum would eradicate sectarian
divisions and center political cleavages around
class and socio-economic issues as the enactment of
a Constitution for Northern Ireland would "remove
the
Constitutional
uncertainty"
of
Northern
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Ireland's position within the United Kingdom.
These policies would allow Protestants and Catholics to agree
together on a set of Constitutional laws "which would lay the
foundations on which to build a new progressive democracy" and
a transcendent Ulster identity (p. 2). Common Sense concludes:
The fact that Northern Ireland's "status II within
the United Kingdom could not be changed without the
consent of at least two-thirds of those voting in a
referendum would raise the siege on "Ulster
Protestants" and create a new atmosphere of
security and stability conducive to reconciliation
and political development. A Northern Ireland
existing by consent would remove the need to
constantly defend the psychological borders (p. 8).
The

following

points

must

also ,be

included

by

both

governments if we are to have a lasting and just peace between
both communities in Northern Ireland:
4)
The Anglo-Irish Agreement and the
InterGovernmental Conference are to be suspended, the
irredentist Articles 2 and 3 of the Republic's
Constitution amended and the 11 border poll" is to
be reintroduced as a demonstration of "good will 11
and incentive for Unionists to forge a 11 deal 11 with
11
the
Nationalist
minority.
It
is
the
over
determination
of
democratic
and
reformist
objectives
by
Nationalist
objectives
that
undermines liberal and accommodationist currents
within Unionism" (Bew and Patterson, 1987, 46).
0

5)
Power-sharing to be
introduced
in
local
government
(County Council) with the Northern
Ireland Office (NIO) ultimately deciding policy if
consensus is not met on any particular issue by
both traditions.
This move would also provide a
caveat--promoting cooperation in both non-political
and political spheres between local communities at
grass;roots levelo
As O'Donnell (1977) astutely points out:
The mutual stereotypes show that a new framework is
possible, that there is every reason for each side
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to see itself and the other as component, good and
wortho/hile.
The name 6f the game can be changed
from
competition
to
cooperation,
when
the
participants attempt to achieve the same goal (p.
155) .
6) New Grant incentives to be introduced by the
Northern Ireland Minister of Education to finance
more
integrated
schools.
"Whilst
coercive
educational integration would be foolish, and no
attempt should be made to close schools, the
available selective incentives to concentrate minds
should be manipulated" (O'Leary, 1987, 35).

7) "Although the European Parliament and Commission
have been insisting on the importance of regional
participation since 1982, arguing that 'top down'
government does not work and wastes money, the
Irish and British governments have refused to take
any
real
initiative"
(Kearney,
1988,
17).
Therefore,
a regionally devolved power-sharing
government in Stormont would build upon present
local initiatives such as the Brookfield Business
Coop ·in Belfast and the North West Centre for
Development in Derry which operates at grass-roots
community level and is funded by the International
Irish Fund. Local community projects "spring up at
community level,
encourage
a
real
sense
of
participatory
democracy
and
then,
ideal1y,
interconnect with other community projects in
Europe or elsewhere in the world" (Kearney, 1988,
12).
Capital will be used from the EU Social and
Regional funds to promote economic growth at the
local and regional level to eradicate the material
disadvantage
of
working-class
Catholics
and
Protestants and alleviate the economic imbalance
between both groups.
8)
Encourage bilateral link-ups, and exchanges
between universities, schools, cities and cultural
institutions in other regions within the EU, whose
rich plurality of cultures will bridge and enrich
both cultures and traditions in Northern Ireland.
The Minister of Education should also encourage
efforts to integrate staff and teacher training
colleges.
Also the installation of satellite
dishes in the schools would allow school children
to break into the global world and out of their own
culture, preventing encapsulation and isolation by
exposing children to new perspectives.
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15. The Structure

How the mediating team will deal with both parties is very
crucial to the whole process.

It is imperative to involve all

social and political actors in the diagnosis and design of the
problem-solving interest-based negotiation process, "not only
to tap their valuable ideas and knowledge but also to organize
support for change and to defuse opposition"
1988, 133).

(Ury et al.,

The failure of the Hillsborough Accord and the

current Joint Declaration to instill cooperation between both
communities and a devolved power-sharing executive provides
the necessary motivation for both disputing parties to try new
procedures.
process,

By

the

involving all

third

party

the

will

parties

advance

in

its

the

design

credibility,

enhancing the probability of having an approved outcome.
In · order
structure

of

to

the

open

a

mediating

"pipeline"
team

between

and

all

the

the

formal

relevant

participating parties, an informal or parallel structure will
be set-up in order to channel information up and down, through
the hierarchy; as change taking place at the grass-roots level
needs to be communicated to the center.

"Accordion planning"

will allow "all of the parties (that will be) affected by the
decision to work together throughout each of the phases,
constantly return to the.ir own organizational bases
assured of continual support"

(to)
to be

(Laue, 1988, 54).

At grass-roots level, the County Council in each district
will

assist

in

organizing

the

ideas

and

opinions

of
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constituents, transmitting them via the political parties and
the paramilitary organizations to the third party mediation
team.

The

Loyalist

and

Republican

paramilitary

groups

similarly, can communicate their thoughts and ideas directly
to both the County Council cluster and the political parties
seated at

the

table.

This

will

allow for

creativity in

deciding the agenda, schedule and time-frame for negotiations
to be implemented.

As Bercovitch

(1984)

notes:

"The more

informal and directive procedures are content-oriented and
related to defining positions, changing the issue structure,
and influencing motivation"

1. 6.

(p. 109).

Strategy

What are the goals and objectives that we wish to accomplish?
For instance, Bercovitch (1984) contends that the objective of
third party intervention is

to

"facilitate

exploration and problem-solving" (p.

communication,

John Burton

25).

(1989),

on the other hand, suggests that a solution to a conflict that
involves

universal

attainable

only

by

needs

and deeply held values

a

analytical

"deeply

as

being

problem-solving

process whereby the parties come to recognize their own needs,
as

well

as

traditional

those

the

power-oriented

reconciling them"
First

of

of

(Reed,

all,

it

other

solutions

1989,

is

party,

and

are

realize

ineffective

that
in

17).

necessary to

get

parties to use interests-based negotiation;

the

disputing

by putting the
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focus on interests instead of rights or power.
to

a

reduced

level

in

entrenched sectarianism.

communal

This will lead

violence,

bigotry

It will be necessary to build an

"incentive package" for both sides into the framework,
the

free-flow

of

monopoly capital

National Corporations

and

(MNCs)

investments

into Ulster,

and

i.e.,
Multi-

the suspension of

the Accord and special security policies, and modification of
Articles 2 and 3 of Bunnreacht na hEireann among others.

The

mediating team will also encourage and facilitate any form of
cultural, sporting and educational contact that will decrease
segregation and increase opportunities for social interaction.
It might also be plausible to propose some ideas to both
parties

(if required to do so)--such as the creativity and

innovation

of

the

referendum

which

permits

cross-cutting

cleavages and shifting alliances on issues to contribute to
peaceful change despite sub-cultural segmentation in the body
politic.

The third party facilitator will also engage each

community to analyze the conflict from its own perspective.
This interplay between the conflict and the design will be
value-laden and constructive, enabling the weakest party to
empower itself.

Attention will also be spent in providing

rights and power "loop-backs" and "back-up" procedures.

Time

will also be put aside to provide the motivation, skills and
resources necessary to make all the procedures work.
These ·objectives will provide the necessary communication
link which allow the disputing parties to recognize the value
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of alternatives and assist them in building a relative power
symmetry.
course

Consequently, a dispute systems design is a logical

of

action to pursue

in

the

Northern

Irelapd

case

because it is,
an analytical problem-solving process in which
parties or their representatives are helped to
resolve their disputes by trained third parties
(which
allows
parties
to)
jointly
develop
agreements which satisfy their basic needs and
values and, therefore, are durable and require no
external enforcement (Bassett, 1989, 15).

17. Costs and Resources

Who will ultimately pay?

It is the designer's job to assess

how long tbe various procedures will take and how much money
will

be

consumed

throughout

the

whole

process.

In

this

instance it is necessary for the third party (EU parliament)
to foot the bill as a good will gesture to the people of
Northern Ireland.
a

The eventual successful implementation of

devolved power-sharing arrangement which contributes

to

democratic conflict resolution and accommodation between both
traditions in Ulster can be engaged in other EU regions where
other ethno-territorial conflicts exist.
What type of resources will ensure the ultimate success
of entry? The intervenor shall have to provide the relevant
staff and time resources if a successful outcome is to be
accomplished. Secondly, the proximity of the EU will ensure
that neither disputing party will view the mediating team as
a non-constructive mediator thereby, lowering access barriers.
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Finaliy,

the objectivity,

fairness and impartiality of the

intervenor has to be communicated to both "camps II to build
trust, therefore, it is necessary "to persuade the disputing
parties that the intervenor has something to contribute to the
existing dispute resolution process"

(Murray, 1984, 612).

18. Critique -- Feasibility and Ethical Criteria

What would be the likely reaction of all the major actors
embroiled in the conflict?

The greatest opposition to such a

venture perhaps would come from the "die-hard" elements within
the PIRA and Sinn Fein,

some of the ultra-Loyalists in the

DUP, and sbme fringe extremist "break-away" elements within
Loyalist

paramilitary

organizations.

These

groups

would

probably contend that conflict mediation is the partisan and
biased entry of

a

third party which seeks

to pacify and

neutralize the Republican and Loyalist movements by focusing
on interests thereby, treating the symptoms and not the causes
of

the

Northern

identity.

Ireland

conflict--territorial

and

ethnic

In this process, these organizations would only be

coopted by the EU establishment.
They

would

pro?ably

problem-solving designs
which

tie.s

together

participation and no

also

assert

that

mediation

and

are purely an American phenomenon
an

American

conflict,

and

view

of

democracy,

cannot

be

applicable,

therefore, to the distinct and separate cultures that co-exist
in Northern Ireland.

Finally,

these extremists would most
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probably asseverate that democracy is a technical problem of
how to make people participate in the system.
management

intervention would assist

(British/Irish or EU)
and support
contrary

that

to

However,

I

the political

system

in making these groups participate in

political

their

A conflict

system,

goals,

which may actually be

aspirations

and

policies.

firmly believe that the problems posed by

extremists in Sinn Fein, the DUP, and Republican and Loyalist
paramilitaries could be dealt with by a political system that
is well founded and internationally acceptable.
Secondly, as in· the case of Cyprus, the possibility of
one community in Northern Ireland deciding to "go-it-alone" is
not

feasible,

detaching

nor

is

themselves

the
from

possibility
the

of

external

situation.

The

powers

Loyalist

community could not expect the Irish government to sit•idly by
while it declared a Unilateral Declaration of Independence
(UDI),

and

any

intervention

by

the

Irish

government

on

"British soil" would clearly constitute a situation in which
Britain could not easily "wash her hands" of the problem.

The

SDLP has worked very hard with the Irish government for an
Irish dimension and the resulting Anglo-Irish Accord, and may
not

wish

to

relinquish

such

a

role

in

the

proceedings

especially, as Articles 2 and 3 of Bunnreacht na hEireann lay
claim to tne whole island of Ireland.
As previously demonstrated, both the British and Irish
governments are grossly uninformed about

the

situa.tion in
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Northern

Ireland

but

also

over

their

overview

of

how

a

political problem develops, from where it develops and how to
solve the issue.

The policies of both governments seem to be

constantly and consistently inspired by events in Northern
Ireland.
The

nature

of

the

intervention

from

concerned

outsiders already embroiled in the conflict (both governments)
offers

only

a

political

panacea

irrelevant

to

the

major

surgery required if the people of the Province are ever to
achieve a society in which they can contribute, and to which
they all wish to contribute.

Clearly, those who would have

most to gain from a problem-solving initiative would be the
moderates within both communities and so, not surprisingly, it
is

they who will

remain

the most

important

force

in

the

progression towards a solution.
A problem-solving interests-based negotiation process
(without the involvement of either government) would allow the
Protestant community to work creatively with their Catholic
counter-parts,

as

the

mis-understanding

and

lack

of

sensitivity from both governments would be removed from the
scenario.

The grass-roots based constituents would contribute

important information through their political representatives
and paramilitary organizations to the mediating team.

All of

the political parties in Northern Ireland would indeed welcome
such a co~structive approach from an exogeneous actor that
understands and is sympathetic to the nature of the conflict
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and the people involved in the inter-communal strife.
main bone of contention however,
organization

to

sit

at

the

Their

would be in allowing any

table

that

has

not

renounced

violence and terrorism.

1.9.

Canel us ions

Some form, of settlement can be arranged between all of the
internal

forces

within Northern

external guarantors

Ireland,

as

the

(the British and Irish governments)

are

not part of the mediating process.
deep-rooted however,

as

long

The conflict in Ulster is

an impartial third party facilitating

team can support each community in solving its basic needs-economic and industrial development,

employment,

education,

contact

cultural

cooperation and frequent
arena.

prescriptions
Akenson
criticise

These

and

(1973)

are

policy

put

comments:

11

It

is

the Ulster situation,

in the

suggestions

forward

most

integrated
socio-

are

not

tentatively.

As

easy for

an outsider

but when he

realises

to
the

complexity of the regions problems, he also recognises that to
propound any simple solution would be arrogance" (1973, 193).
The third party will not place either community in a weak
or

zero-sum

position vis-a-vis

participation of
implementing an

all

parties

effective

in

the

other,

analyzing,

design process

communities to empower themselves.

as

the. active

designing

will

and

endow both

A good outcome and a good

process will be one in which all parties and forces cooperate
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with, and learn to trust and respect each other.

PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE AUTHOR.
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